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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States adopted the Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency ten
years ago in order to advance procedural harmonization in the bankruptcy cases
of multinational debtors.1 This Model Law, drafted by the United National
Commission on International Trade Law ("UNCITRAL"), was placed within a
new Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code.2 Chapter 15 provides a procedure
whereby an official appointed by a foreign bankruptcy court may seek assis-
tance from a U.S. Bankruptcy Court to administer that multinational debtor's
estate.3
Critics of the Model Law have expressed concerns that this new chapter of
the Bankruptcy Code would be ineffectual at best and invite pernicious interna-
tional forum shopping at worst.4 Courts would be unlikely to adhere to the
Model Law's framework of international cooperation, defecting whenever co-
operation would harm local interests or offend local policies.5 Further, debtors
would have a strong incentive to engage in international forum shopping in the
hopes that their chosen bankruptcy laws would be given international effect
under the Model Law.6
Since Chapter 15's enactment, there have certainly been instances in which
debtors appear to have engaged in such forum shopping and in which U.S.
courts have been unwilling to assist the foreign representatives (at least without
certain conditions).' Debtors have been able to engage in forum shopping in
1. MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH GUIDE To ENACTMENT AND
INTERPRETATION (UNCITRAL 1997), available at
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/insolven/1997-Model-Law-Insol-2013 -Guide-Enactment-e.pdf
[hereinafter MODEL LAW and GUIDE, in reference to the separate parts].
2. 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (2012) ("The purpose of this chapter is to incorporate the Model Law on Cross-
Border Insolvency ....").
3. As discussed in more detail infra notes 46-53 and accompanying text, a foreign representative
may file a petition for assistance under § 1502 of the Bankruptcy Code in order to obtain, inter a/ia, a
stay on creditor collection activities in the United States, turnover of U.S. assets, and discovery assis-
tance. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1517-1521 (2012).
4. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International Bankruptcy, 98
MICH. L. REV. 2216, 2234-38 (2000) [hereinafter LoPucki, Territoriality]; LoPucki, Global and Out of
Control?, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 79 (2005) [hereinafter LoPucki, Control]; Frederick Tung, Fear of Com-
mitment in International Bankruptcy, 33 GEO. WASH. INT'L. L. REV. 555, 560 (2001).
5. Tung, supra note 4, at 560; Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-
Universalist Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696, 730 (1999) ("Given the wide differences in bankrupt-
cy regimes throughout the world, modified universalism will often, if not usually, lead to a refusal to
cooperate.") [hereinafter LoPucki, Post-Universalist]; see also John A. E. Pottow, Greed and Pride in
International Bankruptcy: The Problems of and Proposed Solutions to "'Local Interests ", 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1899, 1906 (2006) [hereinafter Pottow, Greed and Pride]; Bob Wessels, The European Union In-
solvency Regulation: An Overview with Trans-Atlantic Elaborations, 2003 ANN. SuRv. BANKY. L. 481,
487 (both discussing the importance of "local interests" in cross-border insolvencies).
6. LoPucki, Control, supra note 4, at 89-90 (describing how the COMI rule opens the door to forum
shopping).
7. See, e.g., Jeremy Leong, Is Chapter 15 Universalist or Territorialist? Empirical Evidence from
United States Bankruptcy Court Cases, 29 WIS. INT'L L.J. 110 (2011) (examining "all 94 Chapter 15
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some cases, and some courts have indeed refused to cooperate due to local in-
terests. While it is far from clear that local interests have rendered the Model
Law ineffectual, there is nonetheless evidence that local interests are extremely
important in understanding how courts have defected from the Model Law's
cooperative schema.
Although the problem of local interests continues to deserve substantial at-
tention, this article describes an additional set of problems that merit considera-
tion, namely, the problem of local methods. In several recent cases, U.S. courts
have interpreted Chapter 15 in ways that are inconsistent with the workings and
purposes of the Model Law even in cases in which U.S. interests are not at
stake. Part III of this article examines three such cases - In re Qimonda AG, In
re Fairfield Sentry, and In re BarneF - in which the courts interpreted Chapter
15 in ways inconsistent with the Model Law not Oust) because local interests
conflicted with the Model Law's cooperative structure but because the courts'
methodological approaches of interpreting Chapter 15 and managing Chapter
15 cases are inconsistent with the Model Law. That is, these cases reflect not a
problem with local interests but a problem with local methods.
These methodological issues are not unique to cross-border insolvency cas-
es;9 however, these issues are particularly salient in the context of the Model
Law's harmonization efforts. At the national level, differing legisprudential10
methodologies can create inconsistent interpretations of the U.S. Bankruptcy
Code; however, the magnitude of these inconsistencies are bounded, as the U.S.
bankruptcy courts are interpreting the exact same language and share the same
legal traditions. At the international level, it is reasonable to expect that meth-
odological differences towards interpreting the Model Law would have even
greater significance, as courts in different countries not only might apply dif-
ferent approaches to statutory interpretation but also would lack a shared legal
tradition. "
cases filed between October 17, 2005 and June 8, 2009" and finding that "while U.S. courts recognized
foreign proceedings in almost every Chapter 15 case, courts granted Entrustment in only 45.5 percent of
cases where foreign proceedings were recognized."). See In re China Medical Technologies, Inc., 522
B.R. 28 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014), for an example of forum shopping in which a group of Chinese operat-
ing entities filed bankruptcy in the Cayman Islands based solely on their place of incorporation.
8. Jaffe v. Samsung Electronics Co., Ltd. (In re Qimonda AG), 737 F.3d 14, 17 (4th Cir. 2013);
Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Katherine Elizabeth Barnet (In re Katherine Elizabeth
Barnet), 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2013); and Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry
Ltd.),714 F.3d 127, 137 (2d Cir. 2013).
9. See infra Sections II.A & II.B discussing the problems of legisprudential methodology and case
management in U.S. courts generally and in U.S. bankruptcy courts more specifically.
10. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 624 (1990) (using the
term "legisprudence" as "the jurisprudence of legislation").
11. See e.g., John Honnold, The United States Uniform Commercial Code: Interpretation by the
Courts of the States of the Union, in INTERNATIONAL UNIFORM LAW IN PRACTICE, ACTS AND
PROCEEDINGS OF THE 3RD CONGRESS ON PRIVATE LAW HELD BY THE INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR
THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW 181, 190 (1989) (noting this problem in the context of the Conven-
tion for the International Sale of Goods: "The dilemma posed by the 1980 Sales Convention and other
2015]
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Further, legisprudential methodology is particularly important in the con-
text of the Model Law because of the Model Law's explicitly purposivist char-
acter. The Model Law requires courts to interpret its language in accord with its
international character12 , explicitly states its objectives,13 and is accompanied
by a Guide to Enactment and Interpretation containing the comments of the
drafters. This purposivist structure calls for an intentionalist interpretation,
which is directly at odds with the textualist methodology that is favored in U.S.
law, and in U.S. bankruptcy law more specifically. 4
Case management issues are likewise particularly important in the Model
Law context, as the Model Law requires courts to take an active role in ancil-
lary cases at both the recognition and cooperation stages.1 5 In the U.S. bank-
ruptcy system, this may pose a particular problem, as Chapter 15 cases are less
likely to be as litigation-oriented as large corporate bankruptcy cases might
be. 6 Whereas corporate reorganization law under Chapter 11 of the United
States Bankruptcy Code envisions an adversarial process whereby creditor
committees play an important monitoring function, 7 the Model Law does not
provide for the creation of such committees. U.S. bankruptcy law has sought to
supplement creditor monitoring through the powers of the United States Trus-
tee; however, this monitoring does not extend to Chapter 15 cases.18 As such,
Chapter 15 cases arguably require a greater managerial role for bankruptcy
judges relative to other types of bankruptcy cases.
While scholarship in the cross-border insolvency arena has focused primari-
ly on the problem of local interests, 9 the problem of local methods has largely
international laws is this: (1) Unlike the situation under the UCC, the gap-filling by reference to domes-
tic law involves fragments of diverse legal systems.").
12. See MODEL LAW, supra note 1, at Article 8.
13. See MODEL LAW, supra note 1, at Preamble.
14. See infra Section II.A.
15. See infra Section II.B.
16. See Hon. Timothy A. Barnes, Notice, Due Process and the Public Policy Exception to Chapter
15 Relief in the United States, INSOL WORLD FOURTH QUARTER 2011, 23, available at
http://www.curtis.com/siteFiles/Publications/Timothy/ 20Barnes / 20Article / 20-
%201W%20Q4%20201 l.pdf ("The third distinction is perhaps the most relevant in this context: both the
United States and the United Kingdom utilize a predominantly adversarial system of justice, as opposed
to an inquisitorial system. The adversarial system, which often goes hand-in-hand with common law
jurisdictions, relies heavily on opposing parties advocating their position to a neutral arbiter (the judge
alone or the judge with the assistance of ajury for matters of factual interpretation).").
17. Michelle M. Harner & Jamie Marincic, Committee Capture? An Empirical Analysis of the Role
of Creditors' Committees in Business Reorganizations, 64 VAND. L. REv. 749, 761-62 (2011) ("Moreo-
ver, Chapter 11 posits the creditors' committee as a "statutory watchdog," with authority to investigate
and monitor the DIP's conduct.").
18. Harvey R. Miller, The Changing Face of Chapter 11: A Reemergence of the Bankruptcy Judge
as Producer, Director, and Sometimes Star of the Reorganization Passion Play, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J.
431, 434 (1995); Jerome R. Kerkman, The Debtor in Full Control: A Case for Adoption of the Trustee
System, 70 MARQ. L. REV. 159, 193 (1987).
19. Even recent scholarship examining the procedural innovation of "synthetic secondary proceed-
ings" are ultimately concerned with the problem of local interests. See, e.g., Bob Wessels, Contracting
[Vol. 12:45
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remained in the background. 2 This article aims to bring the problem of local
methods into sharper focus in the cross-border insolvency area. It examines
how local methods may frustrate the Model Law's hannonization efforts and
considers to what extent the Model Law and its Guide can address such prob-
lems. A better understanding of the obstacles to harmonization may inforn fu-
ture efforts of UNCITRAL, provide some guidance to actors in the Model
Law's cross-border insolvency system, and identify topics in need of further
empirical research.
Part II of this article provides a background on the Model Law and Chapter
15 and summarizes the principle academic debate between the "universalists"
and "territorialists." This part concludes with a discussion of the problem of lo-
cal interests - one of the principle points of contention between these two
camps. Part III then describes the problem of local methods. The Model Law
envisions courts playing an active case management role and engaging in an
intentionalist methodology of statutory interpretation. U.S. Bankruptcy Courts,
however, do not uniformly engage in such methodologies. Courts frequently
apply a textualist approach to interpreting the Bankruptcy Code, and they at
times refrain from managerial judging. These inconsistencies result in defec-
tions from the Model Law's purpose, even in cases that do not implicate local
creditors or policies.
Part IV presents case studies that illustrate the problem of local methods,
focusing on three cases from the U.S. Federal Courts of Appeal - In re Qimon-
da AG, In re Barnet, and In re Fairfield Sentry. Part V then considers the rami-
fications of methodological problems for the Model Law's harmonization ef-
forts, suggesting that the changes to the Model Law's Guide to Enactment and
Interpretation may address some of these problems. Part VI concludes by high-
lighting the need for further examination and study of the impact of local meth-
odology on the Model Law's harmonization efforts.
II. CHAPTER 15 AND THE MODEL LAW
The Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency addresses the creditor coordi-
Out of Secondary Insolvency Proceedings: The Main Liquidator's Undertaking in the Meaning of Arti-
cle 18 in the Proposal to Amend the EU Insolvency Regulation, 9 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 235,
248 (2014); John A. E. Pottow, A New Role for Secondary Proceedings in International Bankruptcies,
46 TEx. INT'L L.J. 579, 586 (201 1)[hereinafter Pottow, Secondary Proceedings]; Edward J. Janger, Vir-
tual Territoriality, 48 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 401, 402 (2010).
20. See, e.g., LoPucki, Post- Universalist, supra note 5, at 762 (briefly mentioning the problem of
differing legal cultures, noting that a modified universalist system would require creditors "to cross the
barrier of legal culture - and perhaps also language -- alone"). Likewise, some of the leading scholars
in the cross-border insolvency area have also been influential in studying the important of local legal
culture in the U.S. domestic bankruptcy system, see, e.g., Teresa A. Sullivan, Elizabeth Warren, and Jay
Lawrence Westbrook, The Persistence of Local Legal Culture: Twenty Years of Evidence from the Fed-
eral Bankruptcy Courts, 17 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 801 (1994) -but have not considered these issues
in the cross-border context.
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nation problems that arise in the bankruptcy of a multinational debtor. Scholars
agree that a core function of corporate bankruptcy law is to stop creditors from
pursuing individual remedies against a defaulting debtor in order to prevent a
creditor race from diminishing the overall value of the debtor.21 Once collection
activities are stopped, bankruptcy then enables a majority of creditors to deter-
mine how best to allocate value, imposing such a plan on dissenting creditors.22
On a national level, bankruptcy law can solve this common-pool problem by
imposing a broad injunction on all creditor collection efforts.23 Bankruptcy law
can further solve the holdout problem by enabling a majority of creditors to
impose a debt renegotiation plan on dissenting creditors.24 Both of these func-
tions require a law capable of binding all creditors - what Westbrook refers to
as the requisite "market symmetry" between the scope of the legal regime and
the scope of the regulated market.2 5 For a debtor with assets and creditors in
multiple countries, there is no such bankruptcy law. There is no one court with
jurisdiction over the debtor's worldwide assets and creditors, and there is no
super-national bankruptcy law. No one court can stop creditors from liquidating
a debtor's assets piecemeal. No one court can bind all creditors to a plan of re-
organization.
The Model Law aims to approximate a super-national structure for multina-
tional debtors by designating the bankruptcy proceedings in one country's
courts as the "main" proceedings and then permitting the debtor's representa-
tive to open ancillary cases in jurisdictions to assist that main proceeding.26
This quasi -centralized structure reflects an approach to cross-border insolvency
law that has been called "modified universalism. '27 "Universalism" in a pure
form envisions a universal bankruptcy court applying a universal bankruptcy
21. See Thomas H. Jackson, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 10-17 (1986); Jay Law-
rence Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2276, 2284 (2000)
[hereinafter Westbrook, Global Solution] ("Despite a lack of general agreement about bankruptcy theo-
ry, there is a consensus that bankruptcy is a collective legal device that operates in each case to protect
and adjudicate the interests of many stakeholders, even though there are disputes about the identity of
the stakeholders.").
22. Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 21, at 2285 ("Such a plan is not achievable unless a
court can bind all stakeholders to the reorganization plan, including dissenters.").
23. The U.S. Bankruptcy Code imposes such an injunction via the automatic stay in § 362. The stay
purports to limit all creditor collection efforts against the property of the debtor, with property of the
debtor defined as including property "wherever located." 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2012). Thus, the U.S. au-
tomatic stay could potentially enjoin worldwide collection efforts; however, the extraterritorial applica-
tion of the stay is limited by the reach of personal jurisdiction.
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012) (setting forth the requirements to "cram down" a plan over the
objections of a dissenting class of creditors).
25. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 21, at 2283 (describing this ability of bankruptcy
law to bind all stakeholders as "'market symmetry': the requirement that some systems in a legal regime
must be symmetrical with the market, covering all or nearly all transactions and stakeholders in that
market with respect to the legal rights and duties embraced by those systems").
26. Id. at 2301 ("modified universalism takes a worldwide perspective, seeking solutions that come
as close as possible to the ideal of a single-court, single-law resolution").
27. Id.
[Vol. 12:45
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law.28 Universalism, of course, is detached from reality, as there is no such
court or law. Modified universalism is an attempt to get the benefits of the the-
ory of universalism within the current international political and legal land-
scape.29 It would have courts recognize one bankruptcy proceeding as playing
the lead role (the "main proceeding"), with all other proceedings (the "ancillary
proceedings") potentially playing a supporting role.
This article discusses this theoretical background and its realization in the
Model Law in the following sections, but this broad introductory description
highlights the two key assumptions of the Model Law: (1) that courts will be
able to identify one proceeding to play the lead role and (2) that courts will be
willing and able to play a supporting role.
As explored in more detail in Part C below, criticisms of the Model Law
have challenged both of these key assumptions, arguing that the Model Law's
supporters underestimate both the incentives of debtors to manipulate such a
structure and the incentives of courts to refuse to cooperate.3" Without a clear
definition of the debtor's "home" jurisdiction, a multinational company may be
able to pick and choose among multiple bankruptcy laws, selecting the one that
would best protect its interests and, potentially, frustrating creditors' expecta-
tions.31 Further, ancillary courts may refuse to cooperate with the main pro-
ceeding when doing so would harm local creditors or offend local bankruptcy
policy. 2 In short, critics argue that local interests will undermine the Model
Law's modified universalist structure.
The following sections discuss the theoretical background of the Model
Law and how the United States has adopted the Model Law in Chapter 15 of
the Bankruptcy Code. These sections provide the context and concepts that
frame the problems of local interests and of local methods. Readers already fa-
miliar with the Model Law and Chapter 15 may wish to skip to Part C below.
A. Theoretical Framework
A primary function of bankruptcy law is to solve the common pool problem
that arises upon a debtor's inability to repay its creditors.33 Acting individually,
creditors would exercise their collection rights under non-bankruptcy law, al-
lowing them to seize and liquidate the debtor's assets. This piecemeal liquida-
tion would fail to maximize the value of those assets and would destroy the
debtor's going concern value. Bankruptcy law serves to solve this problem by
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See LoPucki, Control, supra note 4, at 89-90 (describing how the COMI rule opens the door to
forum shopping).
31. Id.
32. See Tung, supra note 4, at 559.
33. Jackson, supra note 21; Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 21.
2015]
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stopping all creditor collection activities and binding all creditors to a plan for
distributing the assets in a way approved by the majority of creditors.
While a national bankruptcy law can serve this function for a debtor with
assets and creditors within a single country, there is no bankruptcy law that can
fulfill this function in the case of a debtor with assets and creditors in multiple
countries. For a multinational debtor, the natural state of the world is that local
bankruptcy courts will administer the assets within their own territorial jurisdic-
tion - that is, a territorialist approach to cross-border insolvency.3 4 Under terri-
torialism, multiple bankruptcy proceedings would be necessary to stop all cred-
itors' collection efforts; however, these multiple proceedings necessarily carve
the debtors' worldwide assets into territorial chunks. Under territorialism, no
one court can impose a distributional plan on holdout creditors.3 5
The polar opposite of territorialism is universalism, which envisions one
court administering the worldwide assets of the multinational debtor.36 Just as
domestically it is necessary to have a bankruptcy court that can marshal the
debtor's assets and bind its creditors on a national level, universalists argue that
cross-border insolvency requires a bankruptcy court that can marshal the debt-
or's assets and bind its creditors on an international level.3 The political reality,
of course, is that there is no such universal bankruptcy law or procedure capa-
ble of administering the multinational debtor's assets and binding its worldwide
creditors.
Each side recognizes that a cross-border insolvency system will be capable
of resolving bankruptcy's common pool problem only if bankruptcy courts
agree to cooperate with one another.38 Territorialists recognize that preserving
value requires that each country's bankruptcy courts cooperate with one anoth-
er in order to facilitate going concern sales or impose reorganization plans.39
This is cooperative territorialism, and it is effected on an ex post basis: if the
creditors determine that inter-court cooperation would maximize value, they
can petition those courts to so cooperate.40
Universalists also recognize the need for cooperation but prefer an ex ante
34. See Tung, supra note 4, at 559; Jose M. Garrido, No Two Snowflakes the Same: The Distribu-
tional Question in International Bankruptcies, 46 TEx. INT'L L.J. 459, 466 (2011) (noting that "territori-
alism is the most ancient approach to insolvency").
35. LoPucki, Post-Universalist, supra note 5, at 753 (noting that even cooperative territorialism fails
in different ways).
36. See Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 21, at 2277.
37. Id. at 2284 ("From Jabez Henry to the participants in this symposium, virtually all theorists have
agreed that bankruptcy requires a single proceeding in which all of the debtor's assets and claims are
administered under a single set of rules--in traditional terms, in rem.").
38. LoPucki, Post-Universalist, supra note 5, at 756 (noting that inter-court cooperation is necessary
for both modified universalism and cooperative territorialism).
39. Id.
40. John A. E. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism: A Modelfor International Bankruptcy, 45 VA. J.
INT'L L. J. 935, 954 (2005) [hereinafter Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism].
[Vol. 12:45
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commitment to such cooperation." This approach, referred to as modified uni-
versalism, envisions a procedure whereby courts will recognize one bankruptcy
proceeding as being the leader - the "foreign main proceeding" - with the other
proceedings serving to enable the main proceeding to have extra-territorial ef-
fect.42
The key concept with modified universalism is that these local "ancillary
proceedings" (sometimes referred to as "secondary proceedings") enable but do
not require cooperation with the foreign proceeding. These "ancillary" pro-
ceedings may, for example, facilitate the foreign proceeding by stopping collec-
tion efforts within their own territorial jurisdiction, enforcing orders from the
foreign main proceeding, and turning over local assets for distribution to that
main proceeding. At the same time, modified universalism gives the local an-
cillary court the discretion to grant or deny such relief to the foreign proceeding
in order to protect local interests.43
Modified universalism, accordingly, combines principles of both universal-
ism and territorialism. The following section examines this balancing in the
specific context of the Model Law as enacted in Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy
Code.
B. Chapter 15 and Modified Universalism
The Model Law, adopted in the United States Bankruptcy Code under
Chapter 15, embodies the modified universalist approach.' From the United
States perspective, this modified universalism works as follows: a foreign mul-
tinational debtor would file a full bankruptcy proceeding in a foreign court; a
bankruptcy debtor-in-possession, a trustee, or other appointed administrator
(the "foreign representative") would then file a Chapter 15 petition in a U.S.
bankruptcy court in order to obtain that court's assistance with the administra-
tion of the multinational debtor's estate.45 Such assistance may include stopping
all creditor collection efforts in the United States; 46 requesting a turn-over of
U.S. assets for distribution in the foreign bankruptcy case;42 or requesting assis-
tance in conducting discovery within the United States in order to locate the
debtor's assets or to explore potential causes of action.48
This Chapter 15 petition commences a two-step process whereby the court
will determine whether and how to cooperate with the foreign proceeding. The
41. Id.
42. Westbrook, Global Solution, supra note 21, at 2325.
43. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 40, at 952.
44. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Chapter 15 atLast, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 713, 716 (2005).
45. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1502, 1515 (2012).
46. 11 U.S.C. § 1521(a)(1)-(2) (2012).
47. 11 U.S.C. § 1521(a)(5).
48. 11 U.S.C. § 1521(a)(4).
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first step is a gatekeeper one: the court must determine whether it should rec-
ognize the foreign proceeding.49 Only if it grants recognition can it then provide
further relief, such as enjoining creditor collection activities in the United
States. 0 Chapter 15 requires the court to recognize the foreign proceeding as
"main" if filed where the debtor has its center of main interests or as "nonmain"
if filed where the debtor carries on non-transitory economic activity. 1 If the
debtor lacks either connection with the foreign proceeding, the court should re-
fuse to grant recognition. 2
This recognition step represents a universalist-type approach to cross-
border insolvency, as it establishes a nearly automatic grant of recognition for
foreign proceedings, thus creating a choice-of-forum mechanism.5 3 "Nearly au-
tomatic" in the sense that the determination of the debtor's center of main in-
terests may, in some cases, require judicial determination. Further, a court may
deny recognition if recognition "would be manifestly contrary to the public pol-
icy of the United States. 5 4
Once recognition is granted, the court proceeds to the cooperation step, un-
der which it must determine what relief to grant the foreign proceeding in order
to facilitate administration of the debtor.55
If the foreign proceeding is recognized, then it is entitled to certain immedi-
ate relief (if is a foreign main proceeding) and other discretionary relief
(whether it is a foreign main or nonmain proceeding).5 6 While the recognition
stage reflects a pre-commitment to universalism on a procedural level, the co-
operation stage balances universalism and territorialism 7 Certain recognition
is automatically granted to foreign main proceedings, reflecting a preference
49. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1504 ("A case under this chapter is commenced by the filing of a petition for
recognition of a foreign proceeding under section 1515."), 1515(a) (2012) ("A foreign representative
applies to the court for recognition of a foreign proceeding in which the foreign representative has been
appointed by filing a petition for recognition.").
50. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1520, 1521 (2012) (governing the relief available to a foreign representative, and
both sections provide that such relief may be afforded "[u]pon recognition of a foreign proceeding").
51. 11 U.S.C. § 1517(b)(1) & (2).
52. 11 U.S.C. § 1517(a)(1) ("[A]fter notice and a hearing, an order recognizing a foreign proceeding
shall be entered if (1) such foreign proceeding for which recognition is sought is a foreign main proceed-
ing or foreign nonmain proceeding within the meaning of section 1502.").
53. Edward Janger, Universal Proceduralism, 32 BROOK. J.INT'L. L. 819, 842-43 (2007) (describ-
ing the recognition procedures as "automatic" under the Model Law).
54. 11 U.S.C. § 1506 (2012).
55. Id.
56. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1520, 1521 (2012).
57. See Edward S. Adams & Jason Fincke, Coordinating Cross-Border Bankruptcy: How Territori-
alism Saves Universalism, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 43, 80-81 (2009) ("This universalist mandate is tem-
pered by sections 1506, 1515, 1516, and others whereby U.S. bankruptcy judges still retain a wide
amount of control over the administration of domestic assets and creditors' rights. It is, in fact, these
territorialistic provisions that will enable domestic judges to feel comfortable cooperating and coordinat-
ing with foreign proceedings. It is also these territorialistic provisions that will encourage domestic cred-
itors to invest in foreign concerns and foreign creditors to invest in U.S. concerns.").
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for universalism when there is no fear of international forum shopping. Addi-
tional relief is available to both foreign main and nonmain proceedings, but on-
ly if the court is satisfied that such cooperation will not unduly burden local in-
terests. For example, in granting discretionary relief, a court "must be satisfied
that the interests of the creditors and of other interested persons, including the
debtor, are adequately protected. 5 8 As the Guide explains, the Model Law's
Article 22 (Section 1522 in the Bankruptcy Code) reflects the idea "that there
should be a balance between relief that may be granted to the foreign repre-
sentative and the interests of the persons that may be affected by such relief'
59
and "[i]n many cases the affected creditors will be 'local creditors."' 60
A final territorialist protection is found in the Model Law's public policy
exception in Article 6: "Nothing in this Law prevents the court from refusing to
take an action governed by this Law if the action would be manifestly contrary
to the public policy of this State. '61 The Guide explains that "[t]he Model Law
preserves the possibility of excluding or limiting any action in favour of the
foreign proceeding, including recognition of the proceeding, on the basis of
overriding public policy considerations, although it is expected that the public
policy exception will be rarely used. ' 62 It further explains that "[d]ifferences in
insolvency schemes do not themselves justify a finding that enforcing one
State's laws would violate the public policy of another State.
63
Chapter 15, then, commits to a choice of forum procedural rule, thus estab-
lishing the "infrastructure" for inter-court cooperation. Some of this coopera-
tion is automatic, while the treatment of local assets remains in the U.S. court's
discretion. That court may permit the foreign proceeding to administer those
assets, conditionally permit such foreign administration, or deny such foreign
administration altogether.
C. The Problem of Local Interests
Leading up to the Model Law's creation and its adoption in the United
States, there was considerable debate about whether the Model Law's coopera-
tive regime would actually work.64 As with any model law effort, states would
first have to adopt the law and then courts would have to apply it uniformly.
65
58. See MODEL LAW, supra note 1, at art. 22.
59. GUIDE, supra note 1, at 196.
60. Id. at 198.
61. See MODEL LAW, supra note 1, at art. 6.
62. See GUIDE, supra note 1, at 21(e).
63. Id. at 30.
64. See LoPucki, Territoriality, and Tung, supra note 4; Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, supra note
44; Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 40.
65. See Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals, and Legal Unification-the Agency Problem, 3 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 333 (2002) (arguing that the judicial application phase "presents severe difficulties that will
frustrate a wide range of unification projects"); see generally Edward J. Janger, Predicting when the
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Countries may be reluctant to adopt any bankruptcy model law given the deep-
rooted policies underlying distributional rules.66 Once adopted, the Model Law
would be subject to interest group capture67 and to potentially inconsistent in-
terpretation in the courts.68
These concerns are common to almost all unification efforts that depend on
court administration.69 This issue has been relevant, for example, in adopting
the Uniform Commercial Code within the United States and in adopting the
United National Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(CISG).70 In the international realm, scholars have recognized that states are
likely to diverge in how they interpret a uniform text and have sought to identi-
fy the causes of this divergence.71 In the CISG literature, commentators have
explained divergence as a "homeward trend" in the results courts reach.72 This
term refers to the tendency of courts to interpret laws in accordance with their
domestic legal framework. For example, scholars have noted that U.S. courts
will use common law contract principles to interpret the CISG, even though the
CISG is not a part of the common law.73
While in many ways these problems are common to all legal harmonization
efforts,74 John Pottow has identified three characteristics of bankruptcy law that
Uniform Law Process Will Fail: Article 9, Capture, and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REV. 569
(1998); Caroline Bradley, Transatlantic Misunderstandings: Corporate Law and Societies, 53 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 269, 270 (1993) ("Academics, governments and legislators who consider transplanting foreign
rules to solve domestic problems or to make their own legal environment more like those of other coun-
tries must appreciate that rules which look similar may work differently in different contexts."); Michael
F. Sturley, International Uniform Laws in National Courts: The Influence of Domestic Law in Conflicts
of Interpretation, 27 VA. J. INT'L L. 729, 729 (1986) ("Uniform laws are each year governing more and
more aspects of private activity, both domestically and internationally. They have not yet achieved their
full promise, however, because uniformity of interpretation has not always followed uniformity of en-
actment.").
66. Tung, supra note 4, at 559; Pottow, Greed and Pride, supra note 5, at 1902 (identifying the
"prickly" nature of bankruptcy laws' redistributional provisions as a potential source of complication in
cross-border insolvency laws).
67. See Janger, Universal Proceduralism, supra note 53, at 827-28 (noting the possibility of defec-
tions as "the drafters must consider the possible effects of jurisdictional competition and interest group
capture on national legislatures").
68. Tung, supra note 4, at 581-82 (raising the issue of whether universalism is possible under game
theory analysis).
69. See Stephan, supra note 65.
70. See, e.g., John L. Gedid, U.C.C. Methodology: Taking a Realistic Look at the Code, 29 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 341, 343 (1988); Larry A. DiMatteo et al., Interpretive Turn in International Sales Law:
An Analysis of Fifteen Years of CISG Jurisprudence, 24 NW. J. INT'L L. & BUS. 299, 303-05 (2004).
71. See, e.g., Sturley, supra note 65, at 738.
72. John Honnold, DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES 1
(1989).
73. See LARRY A. DIMATTEO ET AL., INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF CISG
JURISPRUDENCE 174 ("Despite the existence of enlightened decision-making by courts and arbitral pan-
els using CISG interpretive methodology, the persistence of homeward trend remains a problem.").
74. See Paul B. Stephan, Courts, Tribunals, and Legal Unification-the Agency Problem, 3 CHI. J.
INT'L L. 333, 333 (2002) (arguing that the judicial application phase "presents severe difficulties that
will frustrate a wide range of unification projects").
[Vol. 12:45
THE PROBLEM OF LOCAL METHODS
make cross-border insolvency especially complex: (1) "insolvency laws have
an expansive reach"; (2) bankruptcy "invades and displaces pre-existing legal
relationships"; and (3) "bankruptcy law is also 'prickly'," as "the bankruptcy
laws on the books in myriad jurisdictions around the globe contain a panoply of
redistributive provisions.' ', 5 In the cross-border insolvency context, this means
that the redistributive rules of a foreign bankruptcy law may threaten to dis-
place a broad range of pre-existing legal relationships between a debtor and its
local creditors.
Displacement of a local redistributional scheme with that of a foreign coun-
try will undoubtedly, in some circumstances, greatly impact the interests of lo-
cal creditors. Lynn LoPucki offers the example of the employees of a Mexican
subsidiary of a U.S. company.76 The Mexican employees, presumably, would
expect that their claims against their Mexican employer would be governed by
Mexican bankruptcy law, which provides broad protections for employee
claims. U.S. bankruptcy law, in contrast, offers a much weaker protection. If
U.S. bankruptcy law were to apply extraterritorially to the Mexican workers,
this would frustrate the expectations of the Mexican workers and greatly reduce
their potential recoveries.
Carrying that example forward, not only would an extraterritorial applica-
tion of U.S. bankruptcy law hurt the interests of the Mexican workers, but it
would also offend the Mexican government's interest in protecting its citi-
zens.77 That is, even if the Mexican workers' interests are not actually impaired
by the importation of U.S. redistributional rules, the Mexican government
might object to ceding sovereignty over the bankruptcy assets within its own
jurisdiction.78
To some degree, the Model Law "sidesteps" these concerns by focusing on
procedural aspects and by authorizing ancillary courts to refuse to apply foreign
law.79 Pottow has argued that this procedural focus is part of the "genius of the
Model Law" harmonization effort.80 Universal procedural rules do not directly
challenge local interests: courts need only determine whether a foreign pro-
ceeding merits recognition as a "foreign main" or "foreign nonmain" proceed-
ing. Only after recognition is granted does a court need to face the more diffi-
75. Pottow, Greed and Pride, supra note 5, at 1902.
76. LoPucki, Post- Universalist, supra note 5, at 710.
77. Pottow, Greed and Pride, supra note 5, at 1915 (discussing the problem of sovereignty and local
interests).
78. Id. ("But there is another related, but conceptually distinct, significant of domestic law: applica-
tion of local law for local law's sake - that is, the vindication of regulatory sovereignty that flows from
the simple fact that the sovereign exercises her might to regulate bankruptcy assets over which she has a
plausible jurisdictional claim.").
79. Pottow, Procedural Incrementalism, supra note 40, at 960 ("The Model Law's most important
feature is that its scope is self-consciously constrained. It does not settle the universalism-territorialism
question. On the contrary, the drafters seemed to sidestep this core issue altogether.").
80. Id. at 939.
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cult and "prickly" choice of distributional rules: should the court defer to the
redistributional rules of the foreign court or adhere to its own local rules? Pot-
tow suggests that pushing these difficult decisions down the road serves not on-
ly a political function of bridging the interests of universalists and territorialists,
but it also provides an opportunity for states to adjust to the increasing frequen-
cy of cross-border insolvencies.81
Universalists have argued that courts will likely adjust to the Model Law as
states realize that universalism's overall efficiency gains offset any losses to
local interests. This argument has two parts. The first is that states will realize
that any losses to local creditors in one case will be offset against the gains ac-
crued overall, the so-called "Rough Wash Theory."8 2 The second is that famili-
arity will also assuage states' concerns about ceding sovereignty - a "secondary
Rough Wash."8 3
Such theories have of course been challenged theoretically and empirical-
ly. 4 Frederick Tung, for example, has argued that some states are more likely
to be "winners" and others to be "losers," such that the overall efficiency gains
of modified universalism will inure to the benefit of only a handful of actors.
Accordingly, no "rough wash" is likely to even out these losses.8 5
Empirical work in this area has likewise focused on courts' willingness to
adhere to the Model Law's cooperative schema. The first empirical project on
Chapter 15 examined recognition orders, finding that U.S. courts routinely rec-
ognized foreign proceedings - suggesting, perhaps, that U.S. courts were adher-
ing to the procedural recognition framework. 6 A later study examined what
courts did following recognition, i.e., what sort of cooperation did they extend
to the foreign proceeding. That study found that U.S. courts were willing to
cooperate, but only conditionally. 8 Courts, for example, did not simply turn
over U.S. assets for administration abroad; rather, courts conditioned the turn-
over on the foreign court's agreement to apply U.S. law or to otherwise protect
U.S. creditors.8 9
The problem of local interests, accordingly, has occupied a central place in
the cross-border insolvency field. And rightfully so. These issues are indeed
81. Id. at 988 (discussing the Model Law's approach as according "states the chance to desensitize
gradually to other states' bankruptcy systems; acclimation is permitted").
82. Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global Insolvencies: Choice of Law and
Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 465 (1991) (positing "that a universalist rule will roughly
even out benefits and losses for local creditors, who will gain enough from foreign deference to the local
forum in one case to balance any loss from local deference to the foreign forum in another").
83. Pottow, Greed and Pride, supra note 5, at 1921.
84. See Tung, Fear of Commitment, supra note 4, at 577.
85. Id.
86. See Andrew B. Dawson, Offshore Bankruptcies, 88 NEB. L. REV. 317, 319 (2009).
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"prickly" points that threaten to frustrate the Model Law's modified universal-
ist model. These issues are complicated, in part, by the lack of symmetry
among state participants - some of which are likely to be net losers and others
to be net winners. And they are complicated by the deep-seated policy concerns
that lie at the heart of bankruptcy law - policies which reflect attitudes about
failure and forgiveness. But, as discussed in the following section, these issues
may be further complicated by an additional layer of difficulty that has so far
received much less attention: the problem of local methods.
III. DEFECTION: LOCAL INTERESTS AND LOCAL METHODS
While there have been recent cases illustrating these territorialist impulses
as U.S. courts have either refused to cooperate or strongly conditioned coopera-
tion in order to avoid outcome differences, territorialist impulses do not fully
explain court divergence. Courts have at times departed from the Model Law's
structure and purpose even when there is no evidence of outcome differences,
i.e., even when there is no indication that defection furthers local creditors or
local policy. These defections stem instead from problems of interpretative
methodology and case management, reflecting a difficulty in understanding and
implementing a law that is systematically different than the overall Bankruptcy
Code within which Chapter 15 resides. This article refers to these problems as
arising from local methods.
Questions about the proper methodology of statutory interpretation and case
management are not unique to Chapter 15 or even to bankruptcy more general-
ly. There have been many studies on the proper methodology of statutory inter-
pretation broadly and in the bankruptcy context more specifically.9" Scholars
have also focused on the proper method of judicial case management, discuss-
ing the role of judges as adjudicators and as case facilitators; again, some of
these studies focus on courts generally and others focus on bankruptcy courts
more specifically.91
Although these methodological problems are not unique to the Model Law,
they are particularly important in this context. The problems of local methods
have received relatively little attention in this field compared to the problems of
90. See, e.g., Daniel J. Bussel, Textualism's Failures: A Study of Overruled Bankruptcy Decisions,
53 VAND. L. REv. 887, 900 (2000) (analyzing textualism through the lens of bankruptcy cases, in part
because of an interest in bankruptcy but more generally because these cases provide a good context
within which to evaluate textualism's effectiveness); Robert M. Lawless, Legisprudence Through a
Bankruptcy Lens: A Study in the Supreme Court's Bankruptcy Cases, 47 SYRACUSE L. REv. 1 (1996);
Robert K. Rasmussen, A Study of the Costs and Benefits of Textualism: The Supreme Court's Bankrupt-
cy Cases, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 535 (1993); Charles Jordan Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Ger-
unds and Conjunctions: The Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYRACUSE L. REV.
823 (1991).
91. See, e.g., Melissa B. Jacoby, What Should Judges Do in Chapter 11?, 2015 U. ILL. L. REV. 571
(2015); Judith Resnick, Managerial Judges, 96 HARV. L. REv. 374 (1982).
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local interests. This is not to say that matters of interpretation and case man-
agement have been overlooked. With regards to case management, Judge
Louise DeCarl Adler has recently published a book through the Federal Judicial
Center, addressing the methodology of managing Chapter 15 cases.92 Judge
Adler acknowledges in her introduction that these cases "may raise unique
case-management issues."93
As to interpretation, with perhaps the only exception of Jay Westbrook's
recent article,94 scholarship has focused heavily on matters of interpretation of
the Model Law, especially on the question of how the COMI standard should
be interpreted in the context of corporate groups.95 Others have considered an
innovative use of ancillary proceedings that may prevent the problem of local
interests from undermining the Model Law's harmonization efforts - an ap-
proach that recognizes both the importance of local interests but also suggests a
potential solution through creative case management
This article does not address these specific questions but instead the broader
question of the methodology of handling Chapter 15 matters. That is, this arti-
cle does not discuss the proper meaning of the "center of main interests" stand-
ard in the corporate group context. It focuses instead on the methodology em-
ployed to interpret that standard. The aim of this article is to highlight the
importance of these methodological issues for the Model Law's cooperative
structure and to tie these issues into the broader literature on statutory interpre-
tation and case management. A better understanding of the sources of defection
may help inform and guide the continuing cross-border insolvency harmoniza-
tion effort.
A. Methodology of Statutory Interpretation
The principal problem of interpretative methodology in Chapter 15 arises
from the conflict between the purposive nature of the Model Law and the tex-
tualist bent of bankruptcy legisprudence. Textualism may be a problematic in-
terpretative methodology both in general and, as some have suggested, in the
context of bankruptcy law more specifically.96 This article argues that it is an
92. Hon. Louise De Carl Adler, Managing the Chapter 15 Cross-Border Insolvency Case 2d ed.,
Federal Judicial Center (2014), http://www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/adler-chapter-15-2d-fjc-
2014.pdf/$file/adler-chapter-15-2d-fjc-2014.pdf (last visited April 30, 2015).
93. Id. at 1.
94. Jay L. Westbrook, Interpretation Internationale (U. Tex. Law, Public Law Research Paper No.
626; U. Tex. Law, Law and Econ Research Paper No. E623, 2015), http://ssm.com/abstract-2589638 or
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssm.2589638 (calling for an international systems-based interpretative ap-
proach to the Model Law).
95. See, e.g., Nora Wouters & Alla Raykin, Corporate Group Cross-Border Insolvencies Between
the United States & European Union: Legal & Economic Developments, 29 EMORY BANKR. DEv. J.
387, 387 (2013).
96. See sources supra note 90.
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especially inapt methodology as applied to the Model Law, as it directly con-
flicts with the language and purpose of the Model Law.
The Model Law's purposive nature is articulated in its preamble, adopted as
Section 1501 of the Bankruptcy Code, which provides that,
"The purpose of this Law is to provide effective mechanisms for dealing with
cases of cross-border insolvency so as to promote the objectives of:
(a) Cooperation between the courts and other competent authorities of this
State and foreign States involved in cases of cross-border insolvency;
(b) Greater legal certainty for trade and investment;
(c) Fair and efficient administration of cross-border insolvencies that protects
the interests of all creditors and other interested persons, including the debtor;
(d) Protection and maximization of the value of the debtor's assets; and
(e) Facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled businesses, thereby protect-
ing investment and preserving employment."
The Model Law's rule of interpretation further supports this purposive na-
ture by mandating that courts consider the law's "international origin" and "the
need to promote uniformity in its application and the observance of good
faith."
97
These provisions of the Model Law have analogues in other bodies of law
designed to promote harmonization in commercial law. The Convention on the
International Sale of Goods, for example, similarly states its purpose in the pre-
amble and then contains a rule of construction that requires courts to interpret
the CISG "with regard ... to its international character and to the need to pro-
mote uniformity in its application and the observance of good faith in interna-
tional trade" and that,
Questions concerning matters governed by this Convention which are not expressly
settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is
based or, in the absence of such principles, in conformity with the law applicable by
virtue of the rules of private -international law. 8
Similarly, the Uniform Commercial Code contains purposive language and
a rule of construction:
(a) [The Uniform Commercial Code] must be liberally construed and applied
to promote its underlying purposes and policies, which are:
(1) to simplify, clarify, and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;
(2) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage, and agreement of the parties; and
97. See MODEL LAW, supra note 1, at art. 8.
98. CISG Article 7.
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(3) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.99
Such statements of purpose and rules of interpretation have led scholars to
characterize the CISG and the UCC as purposive legal frameworks. Indeed,
scholars have noted that the purposivist interpretation is a core attribute of Karl
Llewellyn's and the drafters' design for the UCC.I00
The Model Law's purposivist nature is also reflected and reinforced
through its accompanying Guide to Enactment and Interpretation. The Guide,
in many ways, informs the Model Law in a way analogous to the manner in
which the Official Comments inforn the Uniforn Commercial Code. As with
the Official Comments, the Guide is neither statutory text nor legislative history
but is a core component of the Model Law's harmonization effort.10 1 The Guide
is akin to a legislative history in that it contains notes from the drafters; howev-
er, unlike a legislative history, these notes are specifically designed and adopt-
ed by the UNCITRAL Working Group to provide guidance to courts and legis-
latures.102
A second important distinction between the Guide and legislative history is
that the Guide may be, and has been, changed even after the Model Law's
drafting was complete. Legislative history, of course, is "history" and thus can-
not be prospectively changed after a bill is passed into law. UNCITRAL's
Working Group V, in contrast, continues to work on revising the language of
the Guide and the language of the Model Law. This ongoing nature further re-
flects the importance of the Guide in the Model Law's ongoing harmonization
effort.
While the Model Law's language and structure call for a purposivist inter-
pretation, the prevailing methodology of interpreting the Bankruptcy Code has
been and seemingly continues to be textualism.0 3 Early studies of the Supreme
Court's bankruptcy jurisprudence found that textualism was the predominant
methodology. 4 More recent studies have found textualism to be on the de-
cline, but it still casts an important shadow over bankruptcy jurisprudence.1 0 5
99. U.C.C. § 1-103 (2012).
100. See, e.g., Abbe R. Gluck, The Federal Common Law of Statutory Interpretation: Erie for the
Age of Statutes, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 753, 794 (2013) ("[I]t is universally agreed that legislatures
(as well as parties to a contract) can dictate to courts which interpretive principles to apply. The Uniform
Commercial Code (U.C.C.) is precisely such an interpretive statute."); Gregory E. Maggs, Karl Llewel-
lyn's Fading Imprint on the Jurisprudence of the Uniform Commercial Code, 71 U. COLO. L. REv. 541
(2000).
101. David Frisch, The Recent Amendments to UCCArticle 9: Problems and Solutions, 45 U. RICH.
L. REv. 1009, 1028 (2011) ("The most obvious point is that, although comments play an extremely
prominent role in Code interpretation, they are not part of the statutory text, nor are they legislative his-
tory of the enacting state legislatures in the usual sense.").
102. GUIDE, supra note 1, at 17 (describing the history and purpose of the Guide).
103. Rasmussen, supra note 90, at 539.
104. Id.
105. See Bussel, supra note 90, at 909-10 ("Interestingly, even a casual look at the data indicates
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While some have argued that, in theory, textualism is well-suited to bank-
ruptcy law because it provides for greater certainty, 106 others have suggested
that, in practice, textualism is no more likely to provide certainty than purposiv-
ism.107 That is, judges are likely to reach divergent interpretations of the same
language whether employing textualism or purposivism.
Whether or not textualism is an appropriate methodology in bankruptcy
generally, textualism is unlikely to produce results consistent with the pur-
posivist Model Law. Just as scholars have lamented that textualism does vio-
lence to the purposivist nature of the U.C.C., textualism likewise is inconsistent
with the nature of the Model Law. 108
Textualism is not only inconsistent with Chapter 15's structure and pur-
pose, the justifications for a textualist approach are less apt in this context. Tex-
tualism has been justified by concerns about the use of legislative history.
Judge Easterbrook, for example, has argued against relying on legislative histo-
ry to discern "legislative intent" because legislative intent is a fiction.10 9 Textu-
alism has also been justified based on separation of powers concerns, as it dele-
gates the judicial function of interpreting statutes into the hands of
Congressional committees. 10
These concerns are misplaced in the Model Law context because, as dis-
cussed above, the Guide is not a legislative history. It does not serve to support
a supposedly elusive concept of "legislative intent." Instead, it reflects the actu-
al intent of the UNCITRAL Working Group. The Guide does not threaten to
usurp the role of courts; rather, it exists to provide background materials to in-
form courts' efforts to comply with the Model Law's requirement that courts
interpret its language "with regard to its international origin and to the need to
promote uniformity in application and the observance of good faith." '111
Even though textualism is an inapt methodology for interpreting the Model
Law, it may be particularly attractive in this context as a means of restraining
bankruptcy court discretion. U.S. bankruptcy courts have broad leeway in
that textualism is not a dominant mode of statutory interpretation in the Courts of Appeals, even in the
bankruptcy area, notwithstanding the Supreme Court's particular insistence for a decade on "plain mean-
ing" constructions of the Bankruptcy Code. Approximately 80 percent of the control group cases were
decided on largely or entirely nontextualist grounds.").
106. Rasmussen, supra note 90, at 565.
107. See, e.g., Lawless, supra note 90, at 104 ("[T]he predictability and certainty of textualism rests
on the dubious premise that the diverse persons who make up this nation's federal judiciary can (and
should) interpret language in the same manner.").
108. See e.g., Julian B. McDonnell, Purposive Interpretation of the Uniform Commercial Code:
Some Implications for Jurisprudence, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 795, 853 (1978).
109. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17 HARV. J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 61, 68 (1994).
110. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REv. 673, 706-37
(1997) (arguing that reliance on legislative history violates the constitutional prohibition against delega-
tion of lawmaking power to entities under the exclusive control of Congress).
111. MODEL LAW, supra note 1, at art. 8.
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cross-border insolvency cases to determine when to cede U.S. sovereignty over
U.S. assets. While U.S. bankruptcy courts may willingly exercise this discre-
tion to resolve cross-border insolvency issues, courts of appeal may be more
likely to exercise a strict textualist approach in order to restrict such discretion.
This appellate-bankruptcy court dynamic has manifested itself in the do-
mestic bankruptcy context more generally, as the Supreme Court has steadily
restricted the equitable powers and jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts. Bank-
ruptcy courts have at times been characterized as "courts of equity" because of
Section 105(a)'s broad language: "The court may issue any order, process, or
judgment that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this ti-
tle." '112 This description as courts of equity, however, is no longer accurate, as
appellate courts' strict interpretation of the Code has reined in the equitable
powers of bankruptcy courts.113 In the past, courts had invoked this power as a
utility tool for handling a broad array of problems, for example, to fashion pro-
cedural relief for putative asbestos-related claimants.114 Since then, though, the
Supreme Court has limited the scope of Section 105(a), most recently in Law v.
Siegel in which the Court held that "whatever equitable powers remain in the
bankruptcy courts must and can only be exercised within the confines of the
Bankruptcy Code.
115
The Supreme Court has likewise restricted the jurisdiction of bankruptcy
courts to enter final judgments, a move that directly limits the power of bank-
ruptcy courts. 1 16 It has been suggested that this restriction may reflect "an
agenda to narrow federal equity jurisdiction and powers, at least in commercial
disputes, and in that case to do so by restricting the power of the primary feder-
al court of equity in the financial realm, the bankruptcy court. "117
This aim of restraining bankruptcy courts' equitable powers may likewise
motivate courts of appeal to employ a textualist approach to interpreting Chap-
ter 15 as a means to restrict bankruptcy courts from exercising broad-ranging
equitable powers. And, as discussed in Part III, infra, this appears to be moti-
vating, in part, courts to defect from the Model Law's structure even when lo-
112. 11 U.S.C.A. § 105 (West 2010).
113. See, e.g., Mark Beran, 'Wither' the Equity Powers of the Bankruptcy Court,
https://blogs.law.harvard.edu/bankruptcyroundtable/2014/05/27/wither-the-equity-powers-of-the-
bankruptcy-court!; Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial Lawmak-
ing in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 3 (2006) (arguing that "because American courts are
uncomfortable with unguided equitable discretion, they have tried to limit their equitable powers to
those authorized by statute or grandfathered in under the pre-Code practices doctrine"); Wells Fargo
Bank of Texas N.A. v. Sommers (In re Amco Ins.), 444 F.3d 690, 695 (5th Cir. Tex. 2006) ("Section
105(a) does not permit courts to act as roving commissions to do equity.") (internal quotation marks,
alterations, and citations omitted).
114. See, e.g., In re UNR Indus., 46 BR. 671 (Bankr. N. D. 111. 1985).
115. Law v. Siegel, 134 S.Ct. 1188, 1194-95 (2014).
116. See Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
117. Randolph J. Haines, The Conservative Assault on Federal Equity, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 451,
455 (2014).
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cal interests are not at stake.
B. Methodology of Case Management
Case management methodology concerns the role of the court in granting
relief and adjudicating disputes. Should the court serve as solely an arbiter? Or
should it be an active participant in the case, raising issues sua sponte even
when the parties have not? Scholars have long questioned the proper role of
judges in civil cases and, more specifically, in bankruptcy cases. 118
The style of case management can markedly influence bankruptcy out-
comes, particularly in those cases in which there is little to no stakeholder par-
ticipation to limit the debtor's control of the bankruptcy filing. John Ayer
raised this concern over two decades ago, noting that the Bankruptcy Code
provides little guidance to judges on "the issue of the independent responsibil-
ity of the bankruptcy judge. How far should the judge be permitted to act 'on
his own?'"119 In her recent work on case management issues in bankruptcy,
Melissa Jacoby has noted that Congress has since then only "nibbled on the
edges of the problem.
12
As with interpretative methodologies, case management methodology var-
ies from court to court, and even from case to case. Within the domestic U.S.
bankruptcy courts, judges have reported a wide range of judicial style, with
some reporting that they serve principally as arbiters and others as part arbi-
ter/part case manager. 121 On an international scale, case management style may
vary even more, as some insolvency systems are more litigation-oriented and
others more administrative.
122
The issue of case management has received significant attention in the U.S.
bankruptcy system but has largely been overlooked in the cross-border insol-
vency context. The point of this part of the article is to highlight that the char-
acteristics of bankruptcy practice that point to the importance of case manage-
ment in corporate reorganizations are likewise present in the cross-border
insolvency cases.
Scholars have focused on bankruptcy case management, in part because the
118. See e.g., Resnick, supra note 91; Jacoby, supra note 91; and John D. Ayer, The Forms of Ac-
non in Bankruptcy Practice: An Exposition and a Critique, 1985 ANN. SURV. BANKR. L. 307, 329 (Wil-
liam L. Norton ed., 1985).
119. Ayer, supra note 119, at 329.
120. Jacoby, supra note 91, at 581; see also Melissa B. Jacoby, The Detroit Bankruptcy, Pre-
Eligibility, 41 FORDHAM URB. LA. 849, 861 (2014) (discussing the important, and uncertain, role of the
judge in municipal bankruptcy filings under Chapter 9).
121. Stacy Kleiner Humphries & Robert L. R. Munden, Painting A Self-Portrait: A Look at the
Composition and Style of the Bankruptcy Bench, 14 BANKR. DEV. J. 73, 78-79 (1997) (reporting that the
majority of bankruptcy judges surveyed saw their job as requiring a mix of dispute resolution and mana-
gerialjudging).
122. See Barnes, supra note 16, at 24.
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Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 explicitly sought to modify the role of judges
in the bankruptcy system. 123 Congress sought to shift case management func-
tions from bankruptcy judges to the trustee and the United States Trustee, thus
limiting judges to an adjudicatory function. 124 Congress also hoped that credi-
tors would play an active role in bankruptcy governance. To that end, the Bank-
ruptcy Code attempts to resolve creditors' collective action problem by author-
izing the United States Trustee to form committees of stakeholders empowered
to participate in the bankruptcy and authorized to be compensated from the
bankruptcy estate.
12 5
Many have argued that removing bankruptcy judges from case management
has created a governance vacuum in business bankruptcies. In groundbreaking
empirical work in this area, Professor LoPucki famously concluded that the
bankruptcy reforms had effectively left the "debtor in full control. '126 Based on
his empirical analysis of bankruptcy cases filed in the Western District of Mis-
souri, he concluded that "[flack of objection or request from the creditors'
committee seemed frequently to be considered by the court as an indication that
all was well, rather than that the creditors' committee had not organized well
enough to have an opinion, as was probably more often the case." 127
Since then, Congress has responded by augmenting the role of the United
States Trustee in small business cases,128 thus providing a stronger monitoring
presence in those cases in which creditor monitoring is less reliable. 129 Courts
have also responded to the governance gap in bankruptcy cases by engaging in
more active case management in order to fill this governance vacuum. 130 For
example, Richard Levin notes that "judges often move to fill any vacuums in
the administration or management of the cases, because they continue to feel
123. See Miller, supra note 18, at 431.
124. Id. at 433-34.
125. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1102 (permitting the appointment of committees), 1103 (authorizing committees
to hire professionals and to, inter alia, investigate the debtor's actions and financial conditions and to
participate in plan negotiations), and 328 & 330 (authorizing the committee to employ professionals that
may be paid out of the estate) (2012).
126. LoPucki, The Debtor in Full Control Systems Failure Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy
Code? (pt. 2), 57 AM. BANKR. L. J. 247, 250 (1983) [hereinafter LoPucki, Debtor in Full Control].
127. Id. at 253.
128. Timothy J. Curtin, Karen Gross, and Albert Togut, Debtors-Out-Of-Control: A Look at Chap-
ter 11 's Check and Balance System, 1988 ANN. SURV. OF BANKR. LAW 4.
129. See Edward R. Morrison, Bankruptcy Decision Making: An Empirical Study of Continuation
Bias in Small-Business Bankruptcies, 50 JL. & EcoN. 381, 394 (2007) (concluding that LoPucki's con-
tinuation bias is no longer a concern as creditors and trustees are actively involved in managing the
case).
130. See Richard B. Levin, Towards A Model ofBankruptcy Administration, 44 S.C. L. REV. 963,
968 (1993) (noting that "judges often move to fill any vacuums in the administration or management of
the cases, because they continue to feel responsible for the expeditious resolution of their cases"); Hum-
phries & Munden, supra note 121, at 78-79 (reporting that the majority of bankruptcy judges surveyed
saw their job as requiring a mix of dispute resolution and managerial judging).
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responsible for the expeditious resolution of their cases.'131
The domestic bankruptcy system, then, can be understood to have adjusted
to governance vacuums in some cases in order to limit the "debtor in full con-
trol" problem. Through more active case management and oversight, bankrupt-
cy practice may no longer be as susceptible to the fallacy exposed by LoPucki' s
study, namely the fallacy that lack of creditor objections is tantamount to credi-
tor consent. It is now more widely understood that creditor silence may reflect
creditor coordination problems more than actual consent.
The cross-border insolvency area, though, remains susceptible to this falla-
cy of creditor consent for at least three reasons. First, the Model Law is still
relatively new. Even though the Model Law has been in effect in the United
States for ten years now, it is a niche area of bankruptcy law with relatively few
opportunities for the practice to evolve.
Second, the creditor consent fallacy is particularly problematic in this area
because there is even less reason to believe that creditors will participate at all.
Under Chapter 15, there is no role for the United States Trustee or for a com-
mittee of creditors or other stakeholders. Interested parties may face not only
the coordination problems typical to creditors but also the further obstacles of
being geographically dispersed. Thus, in some important ways, Chapter 15 cas-
es are back to the "Debtor in Full Control" scenario, only this time it is the for-
eign representative in full control.
Third, the Model Law requires more managerial judging in some areas, as
the Model Law and the Guide require courts to exercise independent judgment
as to the recognition and cooperation stages. At the recognition stage, for ex-
ample, the court is entitled to presume that the debtor's center of main interests
is at its registered office; 13 2 however, the Guide clarifies that a court "will be
required to consider independently where the debtor's centre of main interests
is located." '133 At the cooperation stage, the Model Law specifically requires
that, in granting discretionary relief to the foreign representative, the court be
"satisfied that the interests of creditors in this State are adequately protect-
ed."134 The Model Law further specifically provides that a court may sua spon-
te modify or terminate any relief.
135
Despite such language in the Model Law and the Guide, courts in Chapter
15 cases are prone to the same error identified by LoPucki's early study: they
tend to view the lack of objections as indicating creditor consent.136 The au-
131. Id.
132. 11 U.S.C. § 1516(c) (2014).
133. GuIDE, supra note 1, at 143 (noting the court's need to do so when "there appears to be a
separation between the place of the debtor's registered office and its alleged centre of main interests").
134. See MODEL LAW, supra note 1, at art. 21.
135. Id. at art. 22(3).
136. LoPucki, Debtor in Full Control, supra note 126.
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thor's prior empirical analysis of all Chapter 15 petitions between 2005 and
2008 found that courts granted recognition to foreign proceedings even when
there was a tenuous connection at best between the debtor and the jurisdiction
of the foreign proceeding.137 For example, between 2005 and 2008, about 20
percent of all Chapter 15 petitions sought relief related to a haven jurisdiction
bankruptcy filing.138 In these cases, the debtor had nothing more than a letter-
box presence in the haven jurisdiction. Nonetheless, U.S. courts recognized the
haven proceeding as a foreign main proceeding. In one case in which the court
denied recognition as a foreign main proceeding, the court even said that but
for the foreign representatives' blatant attempts to use the Cayman bankruptcy
proceeding to interfere with a related Chapter 11 proceeding in the United
States, the court would have recognized the Cayman proceeding.139 In doing so,
the court said that it was sufficient that no creditors had objected to the compe-
tence of the Cayman Islands proceedings.140 The court interpreted the lack of
objections as an indication that the creditors consented to the Cayman jurisdic-
tion, thus demonstrating that the creditor consent fallacy may be alive and well
in Chapter 15.
The notable exception to this "creditor consent" approach to recognition
occurred in the petition to recognize the Cayman Islands liquidation of two
Bear Steams hedge funds in 2007.141 In that case, the foreign representatives
claimed that the funds had their center of main interests in the Cayman Islands,
and no parties objected. The court determined that it should not defer to the
creditors, and reliance on creditor consent "would make the recognition process
a rubber stamp exercise. 142 It then held that the debtor's true center of main
interests was in the United States given that "there are no employees or manag-
ers in the Cayman Islands, the investment manager for the Funds is located in
New York, the Administrator that runs the back-office operations of the Funds
is in the United States along with the Funds' books and records and prior to the
commencement of the Foreign Proceeding, all of the Funds' liquid assets were
located in United States."143
137. Dawson, supra note 86, at 336.
138. Id.
139. In re SPhinX, Ltd., 351 B.R. 103, 121 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2006), aff'd, 371 B.R. 10 (S.D.N.Y.
2007) ("However, a primary basis for the Petition, and the investors' tacit consent to the Cayman Islands
proceedings as foreign main proceedings, is improper: that is, it has the purpose of frustrating the RCM
Settlement by obtaining a stay of the appeals upon the invocation of Bankruptcy Code section 362(a)
that would go into effect under section 1520(a)(1) upon such recognition.").
140. Id. at 121 ("But because these are liquidation cases in which competent JOLs under the super-
vision of the Cayman Court are the only parties ready to perform the winding up function, and, im-
portantly, the vast majority of the parties in interest tacitly support that approach, normally the Court
would recognize the Cayman Islands proceedings as main proceedings.").
141. In re Bear Steams High-Grade Structure Credit Strategies Master Fund, 374 B.R. 122 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2007).
142. Id. at 130.
143. Id.
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The Bear Stearns decision highlights the importance of case management.
The case did not turn on a novel interpretation of "center of main interests." In-
stead, it turned on the interpretation of a judge's role in the Chapter 15 context.
IV. CASE STUDIES: DEFECTIONS AND LOCAL METHODS
This section will describe three recent decisions from U.S. Courts of Ap-
peals interpreting Chapter 15, all of which illustrate the problem of local meth-
ods. In each of these cases, the courts ultimately depart from the structure and
purpose of the Model Law.
In the first case, In re Qimonda, there are public policy and creditor protec-
tion consequences - that is, local interests are relevant. Analyses of Qimonda
have thus far focused on these local interests issues.1" This part considers in-
stead the procedural troubles reflected in this case, namely which court should
act first: the foreign proceeding or the ancillary one. In the latter two cases, In
re Barnett and In re Fairfield Sentry, there are no apparent local interests at
stake at all. All three cases, even Qimonda, highlight the important conse-
quences of local methods, as courts' methodologies lead to conclusions incon-
sistent with the Model Law. These methodologies further raise questions about
the efficacy of the Model Law and the Guide in harmonizing cross-border in-
solvencies.
A. In re Qimonda AG
Qimonda AG was a German manufacturer of semiconductor memory de-
vices before filing bankruptcy in Munich, Germany in 2009. One of the Ger-
man insolvency administrator's most significant tasks was to liquidate the
company's roughly 10,000 patents, about 4,000 of which were U.S. patents.
145
The administrator's challenge was that Qimonda had cross-licensed its patents,
allowing other semiconductor manufacturers to practice these patents in ex-
change for a fight to practice theirs. This sort of arrangement is a common solu-
tion to the so-called "patent thicket" that arises in such industries in which there
are so many patents that it is difficult to know with any precision which patents
are necessary for any particular process. 146 This cross-licensing arrangement
may have made business sense for Qimonda as an operating company; howev-
er, it provided no value to Qimonda's creditors in liquidation. Accordingly, the
administrator sought to terminate the cross-licensing agreements and then re-
license the patents for royalties. Under German law, such termination may be
144. See, e.g., John J. Chung, In Re Qimonda Ag: The Conflict Between Comity and the Public Poli-
cy Exception in Chapter 15 of the Bankruptcy Code, 32 B.U. INT'L L.J. 89 (2014).
145. Jaffe v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 737 F.3d 14, 17 (4th Cir. 2013).
146. Carl Shapiro, Navigating the Patent Thicket, INNOVATION POLICY AND THE ECONOMY VOL. 1
121, 127 (2001).
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available; however, Section 365(n) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code prohibits
debtors from tenninating intellectual property licensing agreements. 147
Because Qimonda had subsidiaries, creditors, and assets in the United
States, the German administrator sought relief under Chapter 15 in the Bank-
ruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Virginia. 148 The administrator filed a
petition for recognition in the United States under Chapter 15 of the Bankrupt-
cy Code and sought an order requesting supplemental relief, including turn-
over of U.S. assets and the application of several U.S. Bankruptcy Code sec-
tions. The bankruptcy court granted this petition and then clarified, through an
amended order, that German bankruptcy law would apply to the question of
whether the administrator could terminate the debtor's cross-licenses, conclud-
ing that "the legal theory arises under German law and is best resolved by
German courts. It should not be complicated by superimposing [U.S. Bankrupt-
cy Code] § 365 on the analysis. 149
In so ruling, the bankruptcy court interpreted Chapter 15 as creating ancil-
lary proceedings to assist foreign proceedings, with those foreign proceedings
applying their own local bankruptcy law. Because the U.S. patents belonged to
the German debtor, German law would apply to those patents and their accom-
panying licensing agreements.
15 0
The cross-licensees of the U.S. patents appealed this order, arguing that
U.S. law should apply to their cross-licensing agreements and that the bank-
ruptcy court erred in turning over the U.S. patents for administration in Germa-
ny. The district court agreed, arguing that the bankruptcy court should have
considered whether deferring to German law would sufficiently protect the in-
terests of the U.S. creditors and whether such deference would violate funda-
mental U.S. policy. 151 Ultimately, the bankruptcy court found that German law
would harm U.S. local creditors and offend U.S. policy, as embodied in Section
365 of the Bankruptcy Code. 152
That order was certified for direct appeal to the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals. At this point, the United States submitted an amicus brief arguing that
both the German liquidator and the U.S. creditors were incorrect.15 3 The United
147. 11 U.S.C. § 365(n) (2012). Under this provision, a debtor may reject an executory intellectual
property license but may not terminate the licensee's right to use the license.
148. In re Qimonda AG, 2009 WL 4060083, at *2 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2009).
149. Id.
150. This issue of ownership of the U.S. patents had already been decided in a separate action in the
District of Delaware. See Disclosure Statement with Respect to Joint Plan of Liquidation of the Debtors
and Debtors in Possession, Qimonda Richmond, LLC, and Qimonda North America Corp., In re
Qimonda Richmond, LLC, Doc. 09-10589 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 16, 2000) (Doc. No. 989).
151. Id.
152. In re Qimonda AG, 462 B.R. 165, 182-185 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2011).
153. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support of Neither Party, In re Qimonda AG
Bankruptcy Litigation, 433 B.R. 547 (E.D. Va. Sep. 28, 2012) (No. 12-1802) (Doc. No. 25), 2012 WL
4812564.
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States argued that the bankruptcy court's initial ruling was correct: "[T]he fate
of appellees' licenses in the German insolvency proceeding is entirely, and
properly, a question of German law .... As we explain below, a court in the
United States may have occasion to decide, in a future case, whether to give ef-
fect to the rejection of appellees' patent licenses as a matter of U.S. law. But
the bankruptcy court had no authority, under Section 365(n) or otherwise, to
dictate the results of the German insolvency proceeding.
15 4
The Fourth Circuit affirmed on the creditor-protection point, holding that
the bankruptcy court reasonably balanced the interests of all parties in deter-
mining that turn-over of the assets without the licensee protections of Section
365(n) would not sufficiently protect the interests of the U.S. licensees.15 5 It
dismissed the United States' argument, stating that the bankruptcy court did not
"constrain the operation of German insolvency law in Germany;" rather, "the
bankruptcy court conditioned its grant of power to [the German administrator]
to 'administer the assets of Qimonda AG within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States with the limitation that he was taking the company's U.S. pa-
tents subject to the preexisting licenses, which he was obliged to treat in a
manner consistent with § 365(n).' 1 5 6 The court said this was not an extraterri-
torial application of U.S. law but a finding that the administrator must apply
U.S. law in rejecting the U.S. patent licenses.1 5 7
Although the Fourth Circuit may have been correct that U.S. law should
apply to the U.S. patents, it is not at all clear why the ancillary Chapter 15 court
should make that choice of law decision instead of the German court. The
Model Law's presumption is that the foreign main proceeding would make
choice of law decisions, which the ancillary courts would later have discretion
whether or not to enforce that main court's order domestically. The role of the
ancillary court then would be to determine whether to recognize the foreign
court's order or not. Thus, in Qimonda's liquidation, the German court would
apply German law to the licensing agreements and then seek to enforce that or-
der through the United States Chapter 15 petition. At that point, the court
would consider the local interests issues: would enforcing the order (a) balance
the interests of the debtor and the creditors and/or (b) offend fundamental U.S.
public policy?
Thus, while there are clearly local interests at play in In re Qimonda, there
are also important interpretative questions here: Which court actually leads the
worldwide administration of the multinational debtor's insolvency - the foreign
main proceeding or the ancillary proceeding? This is a step that the bankruptcy
154. Id. at 21.
155. Jaffe v. Samsung Electronics Co., 737 F.3d 14, 29 (4th Cir. 2013).
156. Id. at 25 n.3.
157. Id.
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court initially undertook, albeit with little analysis, and that was later skipped
altogether on appeal.
B. In re Barnet
This case arises from the Australian liquidation of the Octaviar Administra-
tion Pty Ltd (OA), in which Katherine Barnet and William Fletcher were ap-
pointed as liquidators. In seeking recognition, the liquidators averred that they
"are not aware of any creditors of either OA or the Octaviar Group in the Unit-
ed States, 158 but that Chapter 15 relief would facilitate the liquidators' investi-
gation into potential assets in the United States "in the form of claims or causes
of action against entities located in the United States." 159 One of the potential
subjects of the liquidators' discovery efforts was Drawbridge Special Opportu-
nities Fund LP, from whose Australian affiliates the liquidators were seeking to
recover AUD $2 10,000,000.160
Drawbridge objected to the recognition petition, arguing that OA was not
eligible for bankruptcy relief in the United States, under Section 109(a). 161 Sec-
tion 109(a) limits bankruptcy eligibility to "only a person that resides or has a
domicile, a place of business, or property in the United States." Because OA
admitted it had no known assets in the United States, and it clearly had no U.S.
domicile or place of business, the Drawbridge defendants argued that it was in-
eligible for Chapter 15 relief.
The Bankruptcy Court overruled this objection, recognized the Australian
proceeding as a foreign main proceeding, and certified the recognition order for
direct appeal to the Second Circuit.1 62 While that appeal was pending, the
Bankruptcy Court granted the liquidators' discovery motion. The Second Cir-
cuit then granted the application for direct appeal and stayed the discovery.
The Second Circuit applied a "straightforward" exercise of statutory inter-
pretation to determine whether Section 109(a) applies to a debtor in a Chapter
15 proceeding.1 63 The court reasoned as follows: Chapter 1 of the Bankruptcy
158. Verified Petition under Chapter 15 for Recognition of a Foreign Main Proceeding at 12, In re
Octaviar Administration Pty Ltd (OA), No. 12-13443, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 2012) (Doc. No. 2).
159. Id.
160. Petitioner's Response to Objection of Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP to Verified
Petition Under Chapter 15 for Recognition of a Foreign Main Proceeding at 3, In re Octaviar Admin-
istration Pty Ltd (OA), No. 12-13443, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2012) (Doc. No. 2).
161. Objection of Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP to Alleged Foreign Representatives'
Verified Petition under Chapter 15 for Recognition of Foreign Main Proceeding, In re Octaviar Admin-
istration Pty Ltd (OA), No. 12-13443, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 30, 2012) (Doc. No. 13).
162. Memorandum Opinion in Support of Certification of Direct Appeal to the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, In re Octaviar Administration Pty Ltd (OA), No. 12-13443, (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Nov.
28, 2012) (Doc. No. 47).
163. Drawbridge Special Opportunities Fund LP v. Katherine Elizabeth Barnet (In re Katherine
Elizabeth Barnet), 737 F.3d 238 (2d Cir. 2013). The court first worked through "an unusual jurisdiction-
al thicket" before determining that Drawbridge had standing to appeal the recognition order. The court
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Code (which includes Section 109(a)) applies to Chapter 15; Chapter 15 gov-
erns the recognition of foreign proceedings; foreign proceedings are defined as
"proceedings in which 'the assets and affairs of the debtor are subject to control
or supervision by a foreign court;"' therefore, a foreign proceeding may be rec-
ognized under Chapter 15 only if the debtor that is the subject of the foreign
proceeding meets the requirements of Section 109(a).164
The court rejected the notion that the foreign representatives were not seek-
ing recognition of a debtor but of a foreign proceeding "because the presence
of a debtor is inextricably intertwined with the very nature of a Chapter 15 pro-
ceeding, both in terms of how such a proceeding is defined and in terms of the
relief that can be granted. '16 5 It also rejected the liquidators' argument that
Chapter 15's chapter-specific definition of "debtor" overrides Section 109(a),
as Section 109(a) deals with eligibility and not with the definition of "debt-
or.' ' 166 Finally, the court concluded that its interpretation was not inconsistent
with the context or purpose of Chapter 15 and that it would not impair coopera-
tion in cross-border insolvencies, as the liquidators could always obtain relief
under 28 U.S.C. § 1782.167
As to the outcome of Barnet, the case is unlikely to make a lasting impact
on Chapter 15 or to mark a major departure from the Model Law. Although it
imposes a requirement on foreign debtors that is out of line with the Model
Law, it is a requirement that can easily be circumvented. Following the Second
Circuit's opinion, the Octaviar liquidators filed a second Chapter 15 petition in
the New York bankruptcy court, this time asserting U.S. property in the form of
U.S. legal claims and an undrawn retainer with local counsel. 168 The Draw-
bridge witnesses again objected, but the bankruptcy court held that this was
sufficient U.S. property to satisfy Section 109(a)'s eligibility requirements. 169
As to the methodology, however, Barnet shows a misplaced adherence to
the plain meaning approach, failing to appreciate what many lower courts had
expressed before: Chapter 15 cases are different in nature in that the petitioner
is not a debtor seeking relief; rather, it is a foreign representative seeking re-
lief. 171 Prior to Chapter 15, courts had understood this to be true of ancillary pe-
titions under Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code. Nothing in Chapter 15, ac-
ultimately determined that Drawbridge had standing to appeal that order because the discovery order
was appealable.
164. Id. at 247.
165. Id. at 248.
166. Id. at 249.
167. Id. at 251.
168. Chapter 15 Petition for Recognition of Foreign Proceeding, In re Octaviar Administration (OA)
Ptd Ltd., No. 14-10438 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2014) (Doc. No. 1).
169. In re Octaviar Admin. Ptd Ltd., 511 BR. 361 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2014).
170. See In re Millennium Global Emerging Credit Master Fund Ltd., 471 B.R. 342, 347 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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cording to these bankruptcy courts, evinced any intention of altering this under-
standing: 'There is no authority that the adoption of chapter 15 was intended to
abrogate the availability of the tools of discovery to foreign representatives,
whether or not the foreign debtor has assets in the United States."171
This case illustrates the bankruptcy-court of appeal dynamic described
above in Section ILA, as the bankruptcy court interpreted Chapter 15 in light of
the purposes of the Model Law, while the court of appeal adhered to a strict
textualist interpretation to reach a conclusion out of line with its modified uni-
versalist structure. 
172
C. In re Fairfield Sentry
In re Fairfield Sentry raised a question of interpretation regarding the center
of main interests standard. Questions about the COMI determination are cen-
trally important to the functioning of the Model Law. They have attracted sub-
stantial scholarly focus and continue to do so, particularly as the UNITRAL
Working Group V continues to work on guidelines for handling the especially
complicated question of identifying the COMI of a corporate group. 173 Fairfield
raised the specific question of whether the debtor's center of main interests
should be ascertained as of the time it filed its foreign proceeding or as of the
time it filed its Chapter 15 petition. The focus of this analysis is more methodo-
logical, namely whether, and how, courts should use the Guide in engaging in
this interpretation.
Fairfield Sentry was a major feeder fund of the Bernard Madoff's notorious
Ponzi scheme, investing up to 90 percent of their money into the Madoff
Funds. Fairfield was incorporated in the British Virgin Islands (BVI) but all
trading activity took place in New York City. 174 When the Madoff scheme im-
ploded, Fairfield's shareholders commenced a liquidation proceeding in the
BVI and all operations in New York ceased. Roughly a year later, the BVI liq-
uidators filed a Chapter 15 petition in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern
District of New York, seeking recognition of the BVI proceeding as a foreign
main proceeding under Section 1517.
Section 1517 provides that "a foreign proceeding shall be recognized as a
foreign main proceeding if it is pending in the country where the debtor has its
171. In re Toft, 453 B.R. 186, 193 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011).
172. See supra notes 113-16 and accompanying text.
173. See e.g., Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Locating the Eye of the Financial Storm, 32 BROOK. J.
INT'L L. 1019, 1019 (2007); UNCITRAL Working Group V (Insolvency Law) Forty-fifth session, New
York, 21-25 April 2014, Facilitating the cross-border insolvency of multinational enterprise groups, at
1-3, http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/LTD/V14/008/48/PDF/V1400848.pdfVOpenElement.
174. Morning Mist Holdings Ltd. v. Krys (In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd.), 714 F.3d 127, 137 (2d Cir.
2013).
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center of main interests. '17 5 The recognition analysis turned on a question of
timing: if the relevant time for determining Fairfield's COMI was the date its
BVI proceeding commenced, then the COMI was arguably the United States,
since that is where its business was conducted; if the relevant time was the date
of the liquidators' Chapter 15 petition, then the COMI would be the BVI, since
the debtor had by that time ceased all activities in the United States and its only
activities were its liquidation proceedings.
The Second Circuit held that the relevant time was at the time of the Chap-
ter 15 petition, thus concluding that Fairfield Sentry's COMI was in the British
Virgin Islands. The court reasoned that Section 1517's use of the present tense
demonstrates Congress's intent that the court should examine the debtor's
COMI at the time of the Chapter 15 petition.176 In its analysis, the court consid-
ered that center of main interests might be interpreted as "principal place of
business," in which case the court ought to look at where the debtor conducted
its business. Pre-Chapter 15, the Bankruptcy Code had a similar cooperation-
based standard that used the language of principal place of business. 177 Chapter
15 abandoned this language, instead adopting "center of main interests." While
the House Report is silent as to the intent of this change in language, some
courts had interpreted this change to a "center of main interests" standard as
reflecting both the intent to keep Chapter 15 consistent with the Model Law
and the intent not to depart from Section 304's principal place of business
standard. 178 For example, in In re Tricontinental and In re Millenium Global,
the courts quote the following language from Professor Westbrook, one of the
drafters of the Model Law:
Chapter 15 was drafted to follow the Model Law as closely as possible, with
the idea of encouraging other countries to do the same. One example is use of the
phrase "center of main interests," which could have been replaced by "principal
place of business" as a phrase more familiar to American judges and lawyers. The
drafters of Chapter 15 believed, however, that such a crucial jurisdictional test
should be uniform around the world and hoped that its adoption by the United
States would encourage other countries to use it as well.
179
175. 11 U.S.C. § 1517(b)(1) (2012).
176. In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 714 F.3d at 133 ("The present tense suggests that a court should ex-
amine a debtor's COMI at the time the Chapter 15 petition is filed .... It therefore matters that the in-
quiry under Section 1517 is whether a foreign proceeding 'is pending in the country where the debtor
has the center of its main interests."') (emphasis in original).
177. 11 U.S.C. § 101(23) (2012).
178. See, e.g., In re Tri-Cont'l Exch. Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 633 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 2006); In re Millen-
nium Global Emerging Credit Master Fund Ltd., 458 B.R. 63, 72 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011); but see In re
Ran, 607 F.3d 1017, 1025 (5th Cir. 2010), In re British Am. Isle of Venice (BVI), Ltd., 441 B.R. 713,
720-21 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2010); In re British Am. Ins. Co., 425 B.R. 884, 909-10 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
2010); In re Betcorp Ltd., 400 B.R. 266, 290-92 (Bankr. D. Nev. 2009).
179. Id. (quoting Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Chapter 15 at Last, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 713, 719-20
(2005)).
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The Fairfield court rejected this line of reasoning, concluding instead that
Congress, by replacing "principal place of business," intended to "abandon[]
that provision in enacting Chapter 15.180
Although the court found that this statutory text controls its interpretation, it
proceeded to consider whether the Guide shed light on this timing issue.181 As
the court found, the Guide explains that "[s]ince the formulation 'centre of
main interests' in the EC Regulation corresponds to that of the Model Law, al-
beit for different purposes (see para. 141), jurisprudence interpreting the EC
Regulation may also be relevant to interpretation of the Model Law. ' 18 2 The
Guide then provides the relevant language from the EC Regulation: "The 'cen-
tre of main interests' should correspond to the place where the debtor conducts
the administration of his interests on a regular basis and is therefore ascertaina-
ble by third parties. 183 The court gleaned from these sources that the most im-
portant factors regarding the "centre of main interests" standard are regularity
and predictability from a third party creditor's point of view. That is, the most
important feature is that the debtor's center of main interests should correspond
with creditors' ex ante expectations.
Having examined these principles from the Guide, the court then concluded
that: "Overall, international sources are of limited use in resolving whether U.S.
courts should determine COMI at the time of the Chapter 15 petition or in some
other way.
184
The court's analysis of the COMI timing issue reveals the same textualist
approach that was displayed in In re Barnet. While Barnet is likely to have lit-
tle impact on Chapter 15 practice and outcomes, Fairfield Sentry may be more
significant, as it effectively allows a company to liquidate in its chosen forum.
More significantly from a methodological point, however, is the court's treat-
ment of the Guide. The court interprets the Guide as if it were interpreting leg-
islative history, i.e., something to examine only to the extent that the plain lan-
guage of the statute is ambiguous.
Further, in interpreting the Guide, the court gives little or no weight to the
drafters' direction to consider the center of main interests standard in line with
the way that the term is used in the EC Regulation. The principles derived from
that source clearly indicate that the center of main interests should provide reg-
ularity and predictability to creditors. Predictability is important so that credi-
180. In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 714 F.3d 127, 135 (2d Cir. 2013).
181. Id. at 136 ("Although the statutory text controls, first and ultimately, we consider international
sources to the extent they help us carry out the congressional purpose of achieving international uni-
formity in cross-border insolvency proceedings.").
182. GuIDE, supra note 1, at 82.
183. Id. at 83.
184. In re Fairfield Sentry Ltd., 714 F.3d at 137.
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tors can anticipate the governing law and adjust their behavior accordingly.
This purpose clearly requires examining the creditors' expectations as of the
moment of lending, not at the moment an insolvency proceeding is com-
menced. The court's treatment of the Guide not only reflects a misunderstand-
ing of its role in the Model Law schema but also a failure to engage in its con-
tent.
V. THE CHALLENGES OF LOCAL METHODS
As explored above and examined in these case studies, the problem of local
methods poses a significant obstacle to the Model Law's goals of uniformity
and predictability. Methodological problems may exacerbate the problem of
local interests (as in Qimonda) or they may arise even when local interests are
absent altogether (as in Barnet).
Methodological problems may exacerbate the problem of local interests by
introducing another layer of complexity in the modified universalist process.
As illustrated in Qimonda, uncertainty about the proper role of an ancillary
court may complicate modified universalism: Should the ancillary court await
rulings from the home proceeding (as the bankruptcy court initially would have
done) or more actively protect local interests by requiring that U.S. law apply
to the U.S.-based assets?
Methodological problems may also complicate the Rough Wash and Sec-
ondary Rough Wash theories. Those theories posit that modified universalism's
efficiency gains would ease concerns about local interests - both "greed" and
"pride. 185 That is, courts and policymakers will grow more tolerant of outcome
differences between local and foreign laws as they grow familiar with the Mod-
el Law and its potential to increase recoveries for creditors in the long run.
While bankruptcy courts may have sufficient exposure to Chapter 15 cases and
be willing to exercise discretion to tolerate outcome differences, courts hearing
these issues on appeal are less likely to be familiar and, perhaps, less likely to
defer to bankruptcy courts' discretion. That is, the methodological approach to
interpreting Chapter 15 may be directed more by courts with less experience in
this matter and less inclination for a purposive and flexible interpretation of the
law.
186
Even when local interests are absent, methodological problems may still
frustrate the Model Law's goals and policies. Interpretative and case manage-
ment problems may arise from U.S. courts applying a domestic-oriented meth-
185. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
186. This is a problem that may be further exacerbated by longstanding tensions between the Article
I bankruptcy courts and the Article III courts on appeal. See, e.g., Haines, supra note 118, at 513 (exam-
ining the formalist approach courts have used since N. Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.,
458 U.S. 50 (1982) to narrow the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts).
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odology to Chapter 15, despite that chapter's international origins and purpos-
es. Thus, as in Barnet, a court may defect from the Model Law by failing to
recognize that a Chapter 15 case is fundamentally different than one under oth-
er chapters of the Bankruptcy Code.
In some ways, the cross-border insolvency "system" - i.e., UNCITRAL
working groups, courts, parties - may be able to manage the consequences of
these methodological problems; however, treating the causes of these problems
is more difficult. For example, UNCITRAL may respond to "bad" interpreta-
tions of the Model Law by amending the language in the Guide, as it did fol-
lowing Fairfield Sentry, in which Working Group V added language to the
Guide that contradicted the Second Circuit's holding.187 While this may per-
suade some courts to reject the Fairfield Sentry approach, it does not address
the problem of interpretative methodology that produced that result. Likewise,
following Barnet, foreign representatives may respond to rigid interpretations
of Section 109, as the administrators in Barnet in fact did; however, this does
likewise does not address the underlying methodological problems.
Courts may, of course, adjust their methodologies as they become more
aware of these problems and more familiar with the Model Law. There is evi-
dence that courts have done so in the context of Chapter 11, as the contrast of
the LoPucki and Morrison studies can be understood as showing that the bank-
ruptcy system - courts, trustee, parties - adjusted to solve the problem of the
"debtor in full control."188 Potentially, with more time and exposure to Chapter
15, the bankruptcy system might likewise adjust case management and admin-
istration issues to the particular needs of Chapter 15.
At the same time though, the development of court expertise and familiarity
may be threatened by the dynamic between bankruptcy courts and appellate
courts, as illustrated in the case studies. These appellate decisions - particularly
when heard on direct appeal to the Courts of Appeal - may cut short this learn-
ing curve. Early appellate decisions may limit the ability of courts to "play"
with the new Model Law and adjust to its structure.18 9 While this preemptive
effect is most direct as to bankruptcy courts within the appellate court's juris-
diction, the effect may be much broader due to the Model Law's rule of inter-
pretation requiring courts to look to decisions from other jurisdictions.
This places increased importance on the role of the Guide and other sec-
ondary sources in leading the familiarization process. The Guide has the poten-
187. 2013 Revised Guide at 157-59, available at http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/
texts/insolven/1 997-Model-Law-Insol-2013 -Guide-Enactment-e.pdf.
188. See supra notes 127-30 and accompanying text.
189. Lawrence Ponoroff, The Dubious Role of Precedent in the Quest for First Principles in the Re-
form of the Bankruptcy Code: Some Lessons from the Civil Law and Realist Traditions, 74 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 173, 181 (2000) (making this point regarding bankruptcy law generally, arguing that too many re-
ported appellate decisions concerning the Bankruptcy Code "has hampered pragmatic and considered
decisiormaking in the bankruptcy courts").
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tial to educate not only policymakers but also courts, highlighting case man-
agement issues and interpretative approaches.190 The Guide's power to effect
change in this way, of course, is limited. As illustrated in Fairfield Sentry,
courts may discount the Guide, treating it as a legislative history. And if the
language of the Model Law itself is unable to push courts towards a more pur-
posive legisprudential methodology, then there is certainly reason to doubt the
effectiveness of the Guide in doing so.
Nonetheless, the Guide may serve a useful function as courts continue to
adjust to the Model Law. Even though Congress adopted the Model Law nearly
ten years ago, filings under Chapter 15 remain relatively infrequent, and the
majority of these cases raise few issues. Thus, U.S. bankruptcy courts remain
largely unfamiliar with Chapter 15, and federal district court and courts of ap-
peals judges less familiar still. The Guide, along with such important contribu-
tions as Judge Adler's work,191 may assist courts' familiarization process with
the Model Law.19 2 While this would not effect immediate changes - for exam-
ple, it would not overturn Fairfield Sentry - it might gradually guide courts to
appreciate the distinct nature of Chapter 15 as part of the international solution
to cross-border insolvency.193
VI. CONCLUSION
Maintaining uniformity in cross-border insolvency law requires, in part, an
understanding of how courts are likely to defect from the law's language and
purpose. While most of the commentary about defections from the Model Law
field has focused on the territorialist instinct to protect local interests, the cases
discussed in this article suggest that courts may defect even when local interests
are not at stake. Interpretative differences between the domestic bankruptcy law
and the Model Law may lead some courts to depart from the Model Law. Fur-
ther, courts may diverge from the Model Law due to their style of case man-
agement.
190. One possibility, consistent with Westbrook's Interpretation Internationale, supra note 94, is to
highlight the overarching insolvency system and the need to interpret the Model Law to advance the
goals of that system.
191. Frisch, supra note 101.
192. There is some support for the Guide's role in the familiarization process, as the Official Com-
ments to the Uniform Commercial Code have played a key role in courts' adjustment to that major legis-
lative effort. See Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial Code, 58
COLUM. L. REV. 798, 808-09 (1958) (describing the uncertainty about the use of the comments); David
Frisch, Commercial Common Law, the United Nations Convention on the International Sale of Goods,
and the Inertia of Habit, 74 TUL. L. REV. 495, 529 (1999) (describing the interpretative problems in the
well-known case of Roto-Lith, Ltd. v. F.P. Bartlett & Co., 297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962), how the courts
adjusted to the new Uniform Commercial Code, and how the drafters changed the relevant Official
Comments, all leading to the First Circuit's reversal of Roto-Lith in Ionics, Inc. v. Elmwood Sensors,
Inc., 100 F.3d 184 (1st Cir. 1997)); see also Robert H. Skilton, Some Comments on the Comments to the
Uniform Commercial Code, 1966 WIS. L. REV. 597 (1966).
193. See Westbrook, Interpretation Internationale, supra note 94.
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Since cross-border insolvency proceedings are still relatively novel, courts
are more likely to view them, at least initially, through the same interpretative
lens as applied to traditional bankruptcy cases. Courts are also likely to manage
cross-border cases in the same way they manage traditional cases.
While the cross-border insolvency system may resolve the consequences of
these methodological problems fairly quickly, the system will likely take more
time to address the actual problems themselves. As courts become more famil-
iar with the Model Law, they may adjust their interpretative and managerial
approaches to further the goals of the Model Law. But, due in part to the rela-
tive infrequency of such cases and to appellate decisions that may stymy
growth and flexibility, the Guide may likely play a greater role in this familiari-
zation process. By articulating clearly the policies and goals of the Model Law
and by suggesting methodological approaches consistent with those aims, the
Guide may help assist courts to manage cross-border cases more consistently.
Continued examination intro case management and interpretative methodolo-
gies may present further insights into how the Guide may evolve in order to
continue addressing these issues.
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